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BOOK REVIEWS

The Logical Foundations o f Bradley's Metaphysics: Judgment, Inference, and
Truth, by James W. Allard. Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. xviii +
241. $75.00 (cloth).
SAM ADDISON, University of Aberdeen
James W. Allard's book, The Logical Foundations o f Bradley's Metaphysics:
Judgment, Inference, and Truth, is, in one obvious respect, a straightforward
historical work. Viewed as such, it provides a significant and worthwhile
contribution to the study of F. H. Bradley, the often misrepresented but
nevertheless influential nineteenth-century idealist, and in particular his
lesser-read work, The Principles o f Logic. In his opening chapter, "Faith, Ide
alism, and Logic," Allard sketches the social and intellectual conditions
from which the tensions between the deep-rooted Christianity of Victorian
Britain and the emerging fields of evolutionary biology and scholarly anal
ysis of Scripture brought forth the manifestation of idealist philosophy in
the likes of Green and Lotze, who drew from Kant and Hegel. From here
Allard demonstrates why Bradley's treatise on logic was a crucial contribu
tion to the developing idealist philosophy, and then through subsequent
chapters reconstructs Bradley's conception of logic. What emerges is a clear
and intricate path from his logic to the well-known metaphysical positions
of monism and holism found in his more widely read work, Appearance
and Reality. This aspect of the development of Bradley's philosophy has
been under-acknowledged, and as well as remedying this Allard's book
provides a clear and systematic reconstruction and analysis of Bradley's
notably unclear and unsystematic Principles of Logic.
Viewed merely as such, Allard's book would be essential reading for
those interested in nineteenth-century British Idealism. And of course it
is. Yet its readership should be wider than this. For who, it may be won
dered, takes absolute idealism seriously in anything other than a historical
sense? To declare oneself as such, to be actively engaged with the sort of
'speculative' metaphysics that preoccupied the idealists, would be more
likely to prompt an incredulous stare than any defence of Lewisian modal
realism, for example. Furthermore, aside from the outmoded metaphysics,
Russell's well known critique of Bradley's apparently coherence-based ac
count of truth, in which truth is on the one hand a matter of degree, and on
the other hand identical with the whole of reality and thus unattainable,
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would seem to set him outside the realm of acceptability in the eyes of
many philosophers concerned with truth and logic.
Allard notes the unfortunate and inaccurate view of Bradley's philoso
phy as a "weedy exotic" (p. ix), and sets out to present his views as highly
sophisticated and relevant. In Allard's reconstruction of Bradley's analysis
of conditional judgments, he notes that although the "standard textbook
analysis" (p. 89) of universal judgments such as "All animals are mortal"
takes it as given that they are devoid of existential import, it was Bradley
who propagated this view against the traditional Aristotelian understand
ing. The necessary arguments for what is a given in standard contempo
rary logics can be found, it seems, in Bradley's Principles o f Logic. Moreover,
the seed for what has become the contemporary debate over the nature of
truth, developing through the likes of James, Russell, Quine, Strawson,
and so forth, were sown there too. As Allard repeatedly suggests in the
lead up to the final chapter, "Truth," before Bradley, the traditional Aristo
telian view of truth as correspondence with fact was accepted uncritically,
as if a truism.
Through his detailed reconstruction of Bradley's views, Allard gives
enough critique and defence to show how important his work is to any
one considering an analysis of judgment, inference, and particularly
truth. Thanks to Russell, Bradley's coherence-based account of truth is
generally viewed as worthy of some historical interest, but essentially in
coherent. Yet in Allard's exposition, Bradley's account comes across not
merely as acceptable but in parts positively persuasive. His discussion
of Bradley's analysis of singular categorical judgments such as "Caesar
crossed the Rubicon," for instance, sounds strikingly modern, providing
clear and substantial reasons for accepting that the truth value of any
statement such as this is a matter of degree, and never simply true or false
(pp. 182-191).
In this instance, Allard explains that this judgment is incomplete, since
it is intended to be about a particular individual. Yet the proper name,
"Julius Caesar," is only meaningful due to its association with descrip
tions of the intended individual, such as "the man named 'Julius Caesar.'"
Descriptions, however, range across possible worlds. So any description
that lends meaning to the proper name, insofar as it is intended to pick
out an individual, will fail to do so, since the description can by nature
apply to different individuals. One can extend the level of description,
and narrow the range of individuals picked out, but the ideal limit at
which one and only one individual is picked out by a description cannot
be reached.
Of course, we can see that there is a difference between asserting that
the statement "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is true, and asserting that it
is false; to assert the latter would be to err. Bradley agrees. It is the notion
that the difference involves any correspondence between the judgment
and fact, or lack thereof, and further that the distinction is a bivalent one,
with which Bradley takes issue. It is not that judgments are not explicit
enough, but that they never could be. Crucial to Bradley's position is the
claim that all judgments are abbreviated inferences, a conclusion Allard
brings us to over chapters 3 to 5. So not only are judgments by their nature
too general to possess a single truth-value, but their truth is dependent
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upon further conditionals, which can never be made complete. So there
is no statement which can be made unambiguously true. Judgments thus
have degrees of truth, but only as compared to other judgments, since the
ideal limit is infinite and unreachable and hence the degree of truth in a
judgment cannot be given anything like a percentage value. A judgment
cannot be made more true simply by making the description more ex
plicit, or revealing the layers of implicit inference. What instead emerges
is a holistic system whereby judgments derive their truth-value via com
parison with other judgments, rather than in and of themselves. Allard
states Bradley's criterion thus: "One judgment is more true than another if
it is more completely specified than the other in terms of what the person
making it knows" (p. 190).
From this, Bradley's monism should be apparent, since for him the only
complete, unambiguous and therefore wholly true judgment is identical
with the whole of reality. Yet this does not mean that thought and reality
are identical for Bradley. The opposite is true, and Allard shows how the
arguments in The Principles of Logic are intended to construct a system of
logic that avoid what Bradley saw as the "cheap and easy identification of
thought and reality" (p. 149).
This emerges in Allard's presentation of Bradley's approach to the
'problem of inference.' The problem appears as follows: if deductive infer
ences are valid, they can state no more in the conclusion than they do in
the premises, and so they are uninformative; if they are informative they
must state more in the conclusion than they do in the premises, and so
they are invalid. Chapter 6, "The Problem of Inference," examines Mill's
expression and approach to the problem, viewing deductive inference as
subordinate to inductive logic, in comparison to Hegel's solution insofar
as it requires the identity of thought and reality. Neither, of course, emerge
as satisfactory, yet it is not until the end of the chapter that Allard brings
in Bradley, represented as introducing an approach to logic distinct from
other idealists such as Green and Bosanquet.
It is in the following chapter, "The Validity of Inference," that Allard
delivers Bradley's positive approach to the problem, building upon his ac
count of judgment, developed in earlier chapters. Through this it emerges
that the notion that, "If an inference is legitimate, then its conclusion is
asserted in its premises," is rejected by Bradley (p. 165). In the case of the
familiar syllogism regarding all men, Socrates, and mortality, the premise
that "All men are mortal" is given the familiar modern interpretation as a
universal conditional. Its content does not derive from any existing men,
of which Socrates is one. Since Socrates is a man, the term "man" acts as
a unifier, revealing "a new quality of Socrates" (p. 164) and yielding the
conclusion through synthesis of ideal contents rather than mere re-state
ment of what is already implicitly known.
Of course, while inferences can be informative and valid in this sense
for Bradley, there is a further sense in which he denies their validity. The
process of inference has no counterpart in reality, so there is no correspon
dence between judgment and reality, since all judgments are abbreviated
inferences. Because inferences all have ideal contents and are incomplete,
they are not identical to reality, since reality is concrete, complete, and
wholly real.
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It may not be the case that many will be persuaded, by Bradley's argu
ments, into accepting the notion that truth has degrees, and that the only
genuine individual is the whole of reality. There remains, by the end, a
lingering suspicion that Russell's accusations of incoherence may not have
been as far off as Allard seems to suggest. But to swell the ranks of abso
lute idealists is not Allard's goal. What the book does achieve is to present
Bradley's metaphysics as far from abstruse, fanciful, meaningless, and eas
ily dismissed, but one rigorously grounded in a theory of logic. Avoiding
his holism and monism cannot be satisfactorily achieved by simply ignor
ing Bradley, but rather by engaging with his solutions to the problems in
the philosophy of logic and, to an extent, the philosophy of language. It
hardly needs to be stated that the natures of inference, judgment, and truth
are of central concern to modern philosophy. Re-engaging with Bradley in
the way that Allard does in this book not only affirms his position as one
of significant influence, but also provides insights and challenges still rel
evant and important for metaphysics and the theory of logic.

Evidence and Faith: Philosophy and Religion Since the Seventeenth Century, by
Charles Taliaferro. Cambridge University Press, 2005. xi + 457 pp. $75.00
(cloth), $29.99 (paper).
JAMES E. TAYLOR, Westmont College
This book is a volume in the Cambridge University Press series entitled
"The Evolution of Modern Philosophy," edited by Paul Guyer and Gary
Hatfield. Each volume of this series examines the historical development of
a current subdiscipline of philosophy from the standpoint of a contempo
rary practitioner. In this case, the subdiscipline is the philosophy of religion
and the practitioner is Charles Taliaferro, whom readers of this journal will
recognize as a philosopher eminently qualified to produce a work of this
sort. Taliaferro has combined his wealth of knowledge about the history of
modern and contemporary philosophy with his expertise as a careful and
creative philosopher to produce an excellent contribution to this series.
In the introduction Taliaferro articulates four main features of the phi
losophy of religion: it raises fundamental questions about human exis
tence and the nature of reality, draws on almost every area of philosophy,
is relevant to practical human concerns, and contains important issues ad
dressed by most modern philosophers. Throughout the book, he provides
numerous examples of each of these aspects of philosophical thinking
about religion.
Though the book is encyclopedic in scope, Taliaferro attempts to pro
vide it with an organizational unity by treating the concept of evidence,
broadly conceived and systematically characterized, as a reference point.
This and related concepts, together with philosophical argumentation
about religious issues, is the primary focus of the book, though Taliaferro
does include accounts of historical events, especially at the beginning of
most chapters, for some contextualization of the philosophical movements,

